Analysis of many factors affecting RFID data security

The full name of RFID is non-contact automatic ID recognition technology. This technology uses radio frequency signals to automatically identify the ID number of a target to obtain information about the object and obtain relevant data. Because of its fast, real-time, accurate collection and accurate processing of object ID information, the world has recognized RFID as one of the top ten technologies of this century. From a certain point of view, this technology can be called an upgraded version of bar code wireless identification. RFID has waterproof, antimagnetic, high temperature resistance, long service life, long reading distance, data on the label can be encrypted, larger storage capacity, storage information can be changed freely, high-speed moving objects can be recognized and multiple Labels, easy and fast operation, can be applied to various working environments. Among the above-mentioned advantages, it has a wide range of application prospects in various industries such as production, retail, logistics, and transportation.

However, with the further promotion of RFID, some problems have emerged correspondingly. These problems restrict its development. The most significant of these is the security issue. Since the original RFID development designers and application staff did not consider their corresponding security issues, security issues have become a bottleneck restricting the development of RFID. If there is no trusted information security mechanism. The popularity of RFID technology has become empty talk. Imagine how much living space a technology can be stolen or even maliciously tampered with information. It can only become a kind of empty talk like paper. In addition, radio frequency tags that do not have a reliable information security mechanism also have potential security risks such as easy leakage of sensitive information to neighboring readers, susceptibility to interference, and susceptibility to tracking. If the security of RFID cannot be fully guaranteed. Military secrets, trade secrets, and personal information in RFID systems may all be stolen and used. This will inevitably bring incalculable losses to the country, collectives and individuals. Therefore, the security issue of RFID has been mentioned on the agenda.

1 Working principle of RFID system

The basic working principle of RFID system. The communication channel between the reader and the tag is established through wireless signals. The reader emits electromagnetic signals through the antenna. The electromagnetic signal carries the query instruction of the reader to the tag. When the tag is within the working range of the reader. The tag will obtain command data and energy from the electromagnetic signal, and send the tag identification and data to the reader in the form of electromagnetic signal according to the command. Or rewrite the data stored in the RFID tag according to the instructions of the reader. The reader can receive the data sent by the RFID tag or send data to the tag, and can be connected to the back-end server communication network through a standard interface to realize data communication and transmission.

According to the tag energy acquisition method, the RFlD system working method can be divided into: close-range inductive coupling mode and long-range electromagnetic coupling mode.

2 RFID security problems and solutions

After studying the working principle, the hidden dangers of RFID relative to readers and back-end servers focus on readers and tags. The best way to analyze what security problems exist in a system is from the standpoint of the attacker, that is, which attack method they use is the simplest, effective, and covert; it can find the loopholes in this system at the lowest cost. We will patch these vulnerabilities to achieve the purpose of improving system security. The same applies to systems using RFID technology. Suppose an attacker attacks a system using RFID technology from two aspects: on the one hand, the information transfer between the reader and the back-end database, which is encountered by every computer on the network. The problem is the same; on the other hand, the wireless communication between the reader and the tag and the tag itself. The latter is the focus of our research. Because RFID technology requires low cost of the hardware itself, some good security methods cannot be directly applied to this technology. This is the reason why RFID technology cannot widely replace barcode labels so far. Assuming that the first aspect is safe, focus on the second aspect, and the second aspect is divided into the following two aspects: â‘ Internal personnel leak the confidentiality of readers and tags; â‘¡External attacks use software and hardware to readers and readers. Electronic tags attack to obtain valuable information.

2.1 Insiders leak RFID secrets and resolution strategies

There are two ways for insiders to leak RFID secrets: one is to steal the RF tag entity and provide it to the criminals. The criminals then physically remove the chip package in a laboratory environment and use microprobes to obtain sensitive signals. Thus, a complex attack on the reconstruction of the radio frequency tag is carried out; the other provides the key to the criminal. The solution to this threat requires strengthening management within the enterprise and internal personnel to raise awareness of potential safety hazards.

2.2 External attacks use software and hardware to attack card readers and electronic tags to obtain valuable information and solutions

Assuming that there is no insider leakage, external attacks from the attacker will become the main factor affecting RFID security, that is, the use of software and hardware to attack card readers and electronic tags to obtain valuable information. This is also the focus and difficulty of our research. As far as the designed system generally uses RFID technology, it is usually subject to two kinds of external attacks: one is an active attack (tampering information, forging information, replaying information, and interrupting information); , Interfere with the normal operation of the reader and the tag, intercept the tag data to transfer information). These seven kinds of attacks are the most common attacks seen in the commercial field by RFID technology.

The above analyzes all the information needed to complete the seven kinds of attacks. The security mechanism of the RFID system for various attack sub-targets is as follows:

â‘ Prevent tag frequency detection, such as Kill tag principle is to make the tag lose its function, thereby preventing the tracking of the tag and its carried objects. Faraday grille: According to the theory of electromagnetic field, a container made of conductive material such as Faraday grille can shield radio waves. This prevents external radio signals from entering the Faraday grille and vice versa. Putting the label in a container made of conductive material can prevent the label from being scanned, that is, the passive label cannot receive the signal and cannot obtain energy. The signal emitted by the active tag cannot be sent out. Therefore, the use of Faraday nets can prevent privacy intruders from scanning tags to obtain information. Active interference: Active interference with radio signals is another method of shielding tags. Tag users can actively broadcast radio signals through a device to prevent or disrupt the operation of nearby RFID readers. Block tags: The principle of blocking tags is achieved by using a special anti-collision algorithm to prevent tags from interfering. The reader always receives the same response data every time it reads a command. Thereby protecting the label.

â‘¡Prevent tag reading range and energy detection, such as clip tag is a new tag developed by IBM for RFID privacy. The user can tear off or scrape the RFID antenna, reducing the readable range of the tag, so that the tag cannot be read at will. Using clip tag technology, the reader can still read tags at close range even if the antenna is no longer usable (for example, when the product is sold, when the user returns to return the product, the information can be read from the RFID tag)

â‘¢ Prevent the detection of security protocols and the theft of related authentication keys. One is the rigorous security agreement for certification. Such as Hash-I. In order to avoid information leakage and tracking, the ock protocol uses pseudo IDs instead of real tag IDs. The randomized Hash-Lock protocol uses a random number-based query-response mechanism. The Hash chain protocol is essentially a challenge-response protocol based on shared secrets. When using two readers with different hash functions to initiate authentication, the tag always sends different responses. In this protocol, the tag becomes an active tag with autonomous ID update capability. The ID change protocol based on hashing is similar to the Hash chain protocol, and the ID exchange information in each call is different. The system uses a random number ruler to constantly update the label identification dynamically, and also to the TID (last call number) and I. The ST (last successful answer number) information is updated, so the protocol can resist retransmission attacks. David's Digital Library RFID Protocol The digital library RFID protocol proposed by David et al. Uses a pseudo-random function based on pre-shared secrets to achieve authentication. The distributed RFID challenge-response authentication protocol is an RFID authentication protocol suitable for a distributed database environment. It is a typical challenge-response two-way authentication protocol. So far, David's digital library RFID protocol and distributed RFID query-response authentication protocol have not found that the protocol has obvious security holes or defects. The LCAP protocol is an inquiry-response protocol. But unlike other previous protocols of the same kind, it needs to dynamically refresh the tag ID after each execution. Re-encryption (Re-encryption) RFID tag computing resources and storage resources are very limited, so few people design RFID security mechanisms using public key cryptosystems. The second is the protection of relevant authentication keys, including hash locks and random hash locks. Hash chain, key value update random hash lock.

â‘£Prevent frequency detection of RFID reader, such as frequency change;

⑤ Prevent the counterfeit of the interface between the RFID reader and the back-end system, mainly through the security protocol and the security strategy of the network part, which can be solved by mutual authentication.

â‘¥ The monitoring node finds the most sent. Mainly by sending data packets scattered, don't concentrate on one or two nodes, you can also use fake data packets and fake nodes to confuse attackers. [next]

3 Analysis of hidden dangers

Through the research of the above system attack models and the enumeration of security mechanisms, many of them have many hidden dangers of insecurity, and the following analysis is carried out:

3.1 Detection of tag frequency

The Kill command makes the label lose its own advantages. After the product is sold, the information on the label will no longer be available, which is not convenient for future after-sales service and users' further understanding of product information. In addition, if Kill identification serial number PIN is leaked, it may lead to the theft of goods by malicious people; Faraday containers are not compatible with other security mechanisms due to their own shielding effect; active interference of this method may lead to illegal interference, causing The legitimate RFID system is disturbed by f. Seriously, it can block other wireless systems nearby, so you can consider using a tag prevention mechanism to prevent tag frequency detection.

3.2 For label reading range and energy detection

Using the clip label and frequency change mechanism can improve the safety performance together, but here we should pay attention to the relationship between frequency and reading distance.

3.3 Detection of safety protocols

â‘ Hash-Lock agreement. There is no ID dynamic refresh mechanism in this protocol, and the pseudo ID remains unchanged. The ID is transmitted in the form of plain text through an insecure channel, so Hash-I. The ock protocol is very vulnerable to counterfeit attacks and retransmission attacks, and attackers can also easily track tags.

â‘¡ Randomized Hash-Lock protocol. In this protocol, the identification ID of the label after authentication is still transmitted in the form of plain text through the insecure channel, so the attacker can effectively track the label. At the same time, once the identification ID of the tag is obtained, the attacker can impersonate the tag. The protocol is also unable to resist retransmission attacks. Not only that, every time the tag is authenticated, the back-end database needs to send the identification of all tags to the reader, and there is a lot of data communication between the two. Therefore, the protocol is not only insecure. Not practical.

â‘¢Hash chain protocol is a one-way authentication protocol, which can only authenticate Tag identity, not reader identity. Hash chain protocol is very vulnerable to retransmission and counterfeit attacks. In addition, every time label authentication occurs. The back-end database must perform multiple hash operations on each label. Therefore, its calculation load is also very large. At the same time, the protocol requires two different hash functions, which also increases the manufacturing cost of the label and is not suitable for application in pervasive computing.

â‘£Based on the hashed ID change protocol, the protocol has successfully updated the relevant information before the label updates its ID and LST information. If the attacker attacks within this time delay (for example, the attacker can forge a fake message, or simply interfere to prevent the tag from receiving the message), there will be a serious data out of sync between the back-end database and the tag problem. This also means that the legal label will not be authenticated in future calls. In other words, the protocol is not suitable for the ubiquitous computing environment using distributed databases, and there are potential security risks for database synchronization.

⑤ David's digital library RFID protocol. This protocol must include two major functional modules in the tag circuit: random number generation and secure pseudo-random function. Therefore, this protocol is completely unsuitable for low-cost RFID systems.

â‘¥ Distributed RFID query-response authentication protocol, which is in the scheme. Performing an authentication protocol requires the tag to perform two hash operations. Naturally, the tag circuit also needs to integrate a random number generator and a hash function module. Therefore, it is not suitable for low-cost RFID systems.

⑦LCAP protocol This protocol is similar to the ID change protocol based on hashing. Before the label updates its ID. The back-end database has successfully updated the relevant ID. Therefore, the LCAP protocol is not suitable for the ubiquitous computing environment of distributed databases, and there are also potential security risks of database synchronization.

⑧ Re-encryption mechanism, the computing resources and storage resources of RFID tags are very limited, so few people design RFID security mechanisms that use public key cryptosystems. [next]

3.4 Testing for certification

â‘ Hash lock, in this method, because the data answered by the tag is specific for each query, it cannot prevent position tracking attacks; the data transmitted between the reader and the tag is not encrypted, and the eavesdropper can easily obtain the tag Key and ID value.

â‘¡ Random hash lock, in this method, the label answer is random every time, so it can prevent location tracking attacks based on specific output. but. This method also has certain defects: (1) The reader needs to search all tag IDs and calculate for each tag, so when there are many tags. The system delay will be very long, and the efficiency is not high; (2) The random hash lock does not have forward security. If the enemy obtains the tag ID value, the Hash (ID IR) value can be calculated according to the R value, so it can be tracked To the historical location information of the tag.

â‘¢Hash chain, this method is indistinguishable and has two advantages of forward security, but it also has disadvantages: need to calculate a value for each label, assuming that the number of labels stored in the database is human, you need to perform N record search 2N Hash function calculation. N times of comparison, the amount of calculation and comparison is large, and it is not suitable for the case where the label has many days.

â‘£Key value update random hash lock, the first feature of this method is simple and practical. Complex calculations such as random number generators are moved to the factory background database to reduce the complexity of the label. The label only needs to implement two Hash functions H and S, which is easier to implement on low-cost labels. The second is forward security. Because the key value of the label is updated by the one-way hash function 5 after each transaction exchange, even if the outsider obtains the current key value of r, he cannot calculate the previous key value. Therefore, it is impossible to obtain the historical activity information related to the tag. The third machine has small operation load and high efficiency. During each query, set the number of tags stored in the database to N. In this method, the back-end database needs to perform a search of 2N records (because there are two records for each tag), perform 3 Hash function calculations and 1 value Compare and generate a random number R. Compared with the Hash chain method, it is necessary to calculate 2 â…£ Hash functions, N record searches, and N value comparisons, because the calculation delay of the Hash function is longer. The resource consumption is large, so when N is large, the system load will be much smaller. The speed is faster, the delay is shorter, the efficiency is higher, but the safety is higher. The fourth is to adapt to the situation where the number of labels is large. Fifth, the two-way identity verification is realized. Finally, security and privacy protection is effectively achieved. But it also has disadvantages, it cannot prevent the attacker's traffic analysis.

In summary. The compound security strategy of RFID system tag information theft is as follows: ① Clip tags and key value update random hash lock, which is mainly applicable to the case where the security level is low and the distance is close. Their union cannot prevent tags from being tracked; ② prevents random hash locks of tags and key values ​​from being updated. The main reason is that the cost of Sichuan is lower. In the case of a long distance, they cannot prevent the tag from being analyzed for traffic; ③ prevent the tag and distributed RFID query-response authentication protocol. There are no obvious security holes. The instrument is suitable for the RFID system of high-cost tags with high confidentiality performance; ④ Random Hash lock with frequency change and Key value update can be used for higher security level. A slightly higher cost situation.

4 Conclusion

RFID tags have gradually entered our daily production and life. At the same time, they have also brought us many new security and privacy issues. Due to the pursuit of low-cost, high-security RFID tags. This makes it difficult to apply existing cryptographic techniques. How to design an effective security technology solution based on the limited resources of RFID tags is still a very challenging topic. In order to effectively protect data security and personal privacy, and guide the rational application and healthy development of RFIr), it is also necessary to establish and formulate perfect RFID security and privacy protection regulations and policies.

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